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Indians fishing, Moricetown, British Columbia, 1901. While the information accompanying these photographs in the archives does not specify 
whether the persons in them are Gitxasn or Wet'suwet'en, they probably are, as the photographs were taken within the territories of those 
nations. B.C. Archives: E-08385. 
Legalizing Oral History: 
Proving Aboriginal Clai1ns in 
Canadian Courts Lori Ann Roness and Kent McNeil 
L ARGE AREAS OF Canada are still subject to land claims by the Aboriginal peoples, who include the Indian, Inuit, and Metis. These 
claims arise mafoly in regions where land-surrender 
treaties were not signed in the past, notably in British 
Columbia, Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and the 
North. Most of them get resolved through negotiation 
and agreement, but a few end up in court. When that 
happens, the onus is on the Aboriginal peoples to prove 
their claims in accordance with the requirements of the 
Canadian legal system. This article will examine some 
of the difficu lties Aboriginal peoples encounter when 
they rely on their oral histories for this purpose. 
Convincing a Canadian court of the existence of an 
Aboriginal .right can be a formidable task, largely be-
cause Aboriginal rights are derived from use and occu-
pation of lands by the Aboriginal peoples as organized 
societies prior to the colonization of North America by 
Europeans. So proof of Aboriginal rights, and of Abori-
ginal title to land in particular, requires evidence of this 
use and occupation. Because the onus of proof is on the 
Aboriginal peoples, they have to establish their prior use 
and occupation on a balance of probabilities, i.e., b~ 
producing evidence sufficient to convince a court tha_t tt 
is more probable than not that they used and occup1ed 
the claimed lands at the requisite time. Depending on the 
I 
Roness and McNeil: Legalizing Oral History 
Map1 
•~w.Ju,,.IHl/'-11""'~' ........ 
..... ft.,..,.. ..... ""'""-""', . ., ..... ,.·""' 
""'""' , .. ,., . .,.,fl•~' . .,..s,. 
• 
~-
Map of British Columbia showing Territory claimed by the Gitxsan 
and Wet'suwet'en Nations (not to scale), reproduced from 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Reasons for Judgment of Chief 
Justice Allan McEachem, March 8, 1991 , page 6. 
Indians drying cooked berries, Moricetown, British Columbia, ca. 1900. 
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location of the claim, in some cases this can involve 
proving use and occupation almost 400 years ago. 
Compounding the difficulty of proving use and occu-
pation so long ago is the fact that pre-contact Aboriginal 
societies in what is now Canada were generally non-lit-
erate. They did not keep written records, so they cannot 
provide a court with the kind of documentation judges 
are used to seeing in cases involving title to land. 
Instead, they have to rely on other evidence. This can 
include post-contact written records, such as journal 
entries and accounts by European explorers and traders, 
and testimony by experts, such as archaeologists and 
anthropologists. However, where written records do 
exist, they often do not contain adequate information on 
Aboriginal use and occupation of land and tend to be 
tainted by the European perspective of the persons who 
produced them. Archaeological and anthropological evi-
dence, while less likely to be biased, can also be quite 
inadequate. So most Aboriginal claimants are obliged to 
rely heavily on oral accounts of their history maintained 
by elders and other persons who are responsible for 
safeguarding and transmitting this knowledge from gen-
eration to generation. Unless these oral histories are 
admitted in court and given adequate weight by judges 
in Aboriginal rights cases, few Aboriginal claims will 
succeed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada bas acknowledged the 
difficulty of proving Aboriginal claims and has directed 
that impossible burdens of proof should not be placed on 
8.C. Archives A·06215 
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Aboriginal claimants. For example, in Simon v. The 
Queen, a case involving hunting rights stemming from a 
1752 treaty signed in Nova Scotia between the Micmac 
Indians and the British Crown, Chief Justke Brian Dick-
son, for a unanimous Court, said this: 
The Micmacs did not keep written records. Mic-
mac traditions are largely oral in nature. To impose 
an impossible burden of proof would, in effect, 
render nugatory any right to hunt that a present-
day Shubenacadie Micmac Indian would other-
wise be entitled to invoke based on this Treaty.• 
Similarly, in R. v. Van der Peet, Chief Justice Antonio 
Larner cautioned that, in determining whether a claim to 
an Aboriginal right has been proven (in that case a fish-
irng right), 
... a court should approach the rules of evidence, 
and interpret the evidence that exists, with a con-
sciousness of the special nature of aboriginal 
claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in prov-
ing a right which originates in times where there 
were no written records of the practices, customs 
and traditions engaged in. The courts must not 
undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal 
claimants simply because that evidence does not 
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards 
that would be applied in, for example, a private 
law torts case.2 
One of the rules of evidence that has presented par-
ticular difficulty in the context of Aboriginal c laims is 
the hearsay rule. Briefly stated, the rule excludes sec-
ond-band evidence, as when a person testifies about 
what another person has said. That testimony is only 
admissible as evidence that the statements were made by 
the other person, not as evidence of their truth. For ex-
ample, if John testified in court that Mary told him that 
she bad seen Bill steal a car, that testimony would only 
be admissible as proof that Mary actually told him that. 
It would be inadmissible as proof that Bill had stolen the 
car. The main reasons for the rule are that hearsay can be 
unreliable and that it is not the best obtainable evidence. 
As the person who made the statement did not do so un-
der oath, and is not subject to cross-examination, those 
means of ensuring truthfulness are unavailable to the 
court. So for Mary's eyewitness account to be admis-
sible, as a general rule Mary would have to appear in 
court and give testimony herself, as that would provide 
the best evidence of what she saw.3 
As the oral histories of Aboriginal peoples are passed 
on from generation to generation, from the perspective 
of the rules of evidence applied by Canadian courts they 
are largely hearsay. The actual witnesses of most of the 
recounted events are dead, and thus are unavailable to 
give direct evidence themselves. However, in situations 
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Indian women packers, Moricetown, British Columbia, ca. 1900. 
B.C. Archives A-0606 
of this kind, the courts have created exceptions to the 
hearsay rule by admitting second-hand accounts of 
statements by deceased persons in certain circum-
stances. The broad criteria for admissibility under these 
exceptions are necessity and the probability of trustwor-
thiness. The necessity requirement is met by the fact that 
the person who actually witnessed the event is dead, and 
no one else is available to give evidence that is as good. 
The trustworthiness element depends on the context. 
Among other things, a court looks at when the statement 
was made (if after litigation was initiated, it is suspect), 
and considers whether the deceased person had any rea-
son, such as an interest in the matter, to be untruthful. 
Both necessity and trustworthiness are determined by 
the application of common sense and experience by the 
triaJ judge. 
Declarations by deceased persons can be admitted 
under two specific exceptions to the hearsay rule when 
they relate to either reputation or pedigree. Reputation 
can involve, among other things, community acknowl-
edgement of the existence of public or general rights, i.e. 
rights held by the entire populace or a particular seg-
ment of it. Pedigree relates to declarations about family 
genealogy and history, such as relationships and dates of 
births, marriages, and deaths. 
While the oral histories of the Aboriginal peoples are 
undoubtedly hearsay, they can be admitted as declara-
tions of deceased persons under recognized exceptions 
to the hearsay rule. As Aboriginal rights to land are 
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communal in nature, they generally come within the 
categories of publ ic or general rights that can be proven 
by declarations of reputation. Moreover, as kinship is 
integral to the social structures and distribution of en-
titlements within many Aboriginal cornmunjties, the 
pedigree exception can be relied upon as well in appro-
priate circumstances. 
This brings us Lo Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,~ a 
landmark Aboriginal title case that was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in December 1997. The trial 
in that case, which began ten years earlier, was the long-
est and most complex in Canadian hist0ry, requiring 318 
days for presentation of evidence, and a further 56 days 
for the lawyers to make their legal arguments. It in-
volved a claim by the Gitxsan (spelled Gitksan in the 
judgments) and Wet'suwet'en Nations to ownershjp and 
jurisdiction over their traditional territories, encompass-
ing about 22,000 square miles in north-central British 
Columbia (see map). The ownership claim in particular 
depended on proof that the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet' en 
had been in occupation of the claimed territories prior to 
British colonization of the region in the 19th century.' 
The issue of admissibility of oral histories as evi-
dence was addressed by the trial judge, Allan McEach-
em, who was then the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia, in a preliminary judgment 
released in 1987.6 He decided that testimony relating to 
Totem pole, Kispiox, British Columbia, 1899. Photographer V. H. 
Dupont. National Archives of Canada, PA-117168 
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the oraJ histories of the Git~san and Wet'suwet'en was 
generally admissible under hearsay rule exceptions 
relating to declarations of deceased persons, so long as 
it involved events that occurred before living memory. 
In the absence of proof that direct evidence by living 
witnesses was not available, more recent oral history 
consisting of second-hand accounts would not be admis-
sible. But McEachem also struggled with more pro-
found issues of what amounts to "history," and whether 
all aspects of oral history qualify as such. In this context, 
he drew a distinction between historical "facts" and 
"anecdotes," e.g., where the evidence related to legen-
dary events such as the destruction of a village "by a 
huge supernatural grizzly bear that bad been angered by 
maidens using the spines of fi sh as items of personal 
decoration."7 
Chief Justice McEachern did not purport to resolve 
these complex issues in his preliminary judgment on 
admissibility. However, he did say that he preferred "to 
lean towards admissibility," and thus expressed his will-
ingness to listen to the oral histories generally, with the 
qualification that "questionable evidence will be re-
ceived subject to a later determination of admissibility."8 
And he naturally reserved judgment on what might actu-
ally be proved by the evidence, as that would depend on 
the evidence itself and the weight he attached to it. 
At the end of the long trial, Chief Justice McEachern 
produced a book-length judgment in which he dismissed 
virtua1Jy all the claims that the Gi~san and Wet'su-
wet' en had made. In thls article, however, our focus is 
not on the substance of his judgment, but on his treat-
ment of the oral histories.9 McEachern devoted one part 
of his judgment to what he cal led "Some Comments on 
Evidence." In those comments, he expressed his frustra-
tion at the impossibility of separating "what European-
based culture would call mythology and ' real' mat-
ters."10 Contrary to his earlier hope, by the time he wrote 
ills judgment he had come to the conclusion that this dis-
tinction was "overly simplistic."11 He also had to face 
the fact that many of the social and other scientists who 
gave evidence as experts relied in part on oral histories 
to buttress the scarce evidence which exists about 
the social order and identity of the occupants of the 
territory prior to and in the early period after con-
tact.12 
However, he did not change the view be had expressed 
in his earlier judgment on the admissibility of the oral 
histories as declarations of deceased persons, "subject to 
objection and weigbt." 13 
We saw earlier that trustworthiness is an underlying 
requirement for adnllssibility of declarations of de-
ceased persons. But while Chief Justice McEachern did 
decide that the oral histories were generally admissible, 
he did not really find them to be trustworthy. He relied, 
for example, on a work by a leading Canadjan ethnohis-
70 - JOW, Summer 2000, Vol. 39, No. 3 
torian, where the author, Professor Bruce Trigger, cau-
tioned: 
The scientific study of oral traditions is obvi-
ously an exacting task and requires a careful eval-
uation of the reliability of sources. the identifica-
tion of stereotyped motifs that may distort histori-
cal evidence, the checking of the stories told by 
one group against comparable information sup-
plied by others, and, finally, the checking of these 
stories against independent sources of information 
such as archaeological evidence. 
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Used in rhis way, oral traditions may supply 
valuable information about the not too distant 
past. Used uncritically, however, they can be a 
source of much confusion and misunderstanding in 
prehistoric studies. 14 [McEachern 's emphasis] 
McEachern was concerned as well about the way culture 
was interwoven with the oral histories. He observed that 
"Indian culture also pervades the evidence at this trial 
for nearly every word of testimony, given by expert and 
lay witnesses, bas both a factual and a cultural perspec-
tive."1s He found as well that 
the fact that the plaintiffs' claim 
has been so much discussed for 
so many years, and the further 
fact that so much of the evidence 
was assembled communally in 
anticipation of litigation, or even 
during this litigation, is a fac t 
which must be taken into ac-
count.16 
For these reasons, McEachem con-
cluded that the oral histories, unless col-
laborated, generally could not be relied 
upon to establish historical fact. His 
position is summed up in the following 
passage: 
Indian carrying bundle of skins, Kispiox, British Columbia, 1899. Photographer V. H. 
Dupont. National Archives of Canada, PA-117169 
When I come to consider events 
long past, I am driven to conclude, 
on all the evidence, that much of 
the plaintiffs' historical evidence is 
not literally true. For example, I do 
not accept the proposition that 
these peoples have been present on 
this land from the beginning of 
time. Serious questions arise about 
many of the matters about which 
the witnesses have testified and I 
must assess the tota lity of the evi-
dence in accordance with Legal, 
1101 cultural principles. 
Nat ive girls in boat on Skeena River, Kitwauga, British Columbia, 1915. Photographer 
William James Topley. National Archives of Canada, PA-011227 
I am satisfied that the lay wit-
nesses honestly believed every-
thing they said was true and accu-
rate. It was obvious to me, how-
ever, that very often they were 
recounting matters of faith which 
have become fact to them. If I do 
not accept their evidence it will 
seldom be because I think they are 
untruthful, but rather because I 
have a different view of what is fact 
and what is belief'7 [emphasis 
addecfJ 
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However, when it came to considering the evidence 
presented by non-Aboriginal historians, Chief Justice 
McEachem took a very different approach. ln reference 
to them, he said this: 
Generally speaking, I accept just about eve1ything 
1'1ey put before me because they were largely col-
lectors of archival, historical documents. In most 
cases they provided much useful information with 
minimal editorial comment. Their marvelous col-
lections largely spoke for themselves. 18 [emphasis 
added] 
McEachero's bias in favor of the written word is clearly 
evident in this passage. It appears in other parts of his 
judgment as well. For example, he gave much more cre-
dence to written reports prepared for the Hudson's Bay 
Company by William Brown, who established the 
Company's first post in the region on Babine Lake in 
1822, than he gave to the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet' en's 
oral histories. McEachem referred to Brown's reports as 
"a rich source of historical information about the people 
he encountered both at his fort and on his travels," and 
added: "I have no hesitation accepting the information 
contained in them." 19 While discounting the reliability of 
the oral bfatories because they contained cultural ele-
ments, he displayed little awareness that the observa-
tions recorded in Brown's reports might have been just 
as influenced by the trader's cultural perspective. 
Chief Justice McEachem's judgment was appealed to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, where certain 
aspects of it were overturned and others affirmed.211 The 
case then went to the Supreme Court of Canada. Instead 
of ruling on the substantive issues, that Court laid down 
some broad principles of law relating to Aboriginal land 
rights, and ordered a new trial. One reason the Supreme 
Court declined to decide the substantive issues was that 
the way the case bad originally been pleaded and the 
way it was finally argued were different. But the Court 
gave another reason as well that relates directly to our 
discussion, namely, that McEachem's treatment of the 
oral histories was so misguided that bis factual findings 
could not stand. Writing the leading judgment, Antonio 
Lamer, the Chief Justice of Canada, put it this way: 
The trial judge, after refusing to admit, or giving 
no independent weight to these oral histories, 
reached the conclusion that the appellants had not 
demonstrated the requisite degree of occupation 
for "ownership." Had the trial judge assessed the 
oral histories correctly, his conclusions on these 
issues of fact might have been very different.21 
So how did McEachem go wrong? According to 
Chief Justice Lamer, he did not pay sufficient attention 
to the perspective of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en in 
applying the rules of evidence and in interpreting the 
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Indians, Hazelton, British Columbia, 1907-1912. 
National Archives of Canada, PA-095750 
evidence presented by them. Relying on his own deci-
sion in Van der Peet, and io particular on the passage 
from that judgment quoted earlier in this article,22 Lamer 
said that the sui generis nature of Aboriginal rights and 
the "evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating 
aboriginal claims . .. demand a unique approach to the 
treatment of evidence which accords due weight to the 
perspective of aboriginal peoples," while preserving 
"the Canadian legal and constitutional structure."23 Jn 
practical terms, according due weight to Aboriginal per-
spectives "requires the courts to come to terms with the 
oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, for many 
aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past."24 
At the same time, Chief Justice Lamer acknowledged 
some of the difficulties and challenges presented by use 
of oral histories in a court of law. Not only are they 
largely hearsay, but they also have a "broad social role 
not only 'as a repository of historical knowledge for a 
culture,' but also as an expression of 'the values and 
mores of [that] culture. "'2.1 Lamer also quoted from an 
earlier Supreme Court decision where fostice Brian 
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Indian totem pole, Hazelton, British Columbia, 1910. 
National Archives of Canada, PA-095506 
Dickson (later Chief Justice of Canada) had said that 
"[c]laims to aboriginal title are woven with history, leg-
end, politics and moral obligations."Ui As Lamer noted, 
[t]he difficulty with these features of oral histories 
is that they are tangential to the ultimate purpose 
of the fact-finding process at trial - the determi-
nation of the historical truth.27 
But notwithstanding these difficulties, Lamer stated that 
the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that 
this type of evidence can be accommodated and 
placed on an equal footing with the types of his-
torical evidence that courts are familiar with, 
which largely consists of historical documents.28 
At this point, it is worth recalling that Chief Justice 
McEachern was aware of the need to separate the his-
torical facts imbedded in oral histories from what be 
called mythological and cultural elements. But after 
318 days of hearing evidence, he confessed that he 
was unable to do so, as he found the distinction itself 
to be "overly simplistic."29 As neither the Gitxsan and 
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Wet'suwet' en witnesses nor the scientists who gave 
expert evidence made this distinction, McEachem real-
ized that he was incapable of telling the difference. 
However, as we have seen, this difficulty led him to dis-
count the value of the oral histories, unless corroborated 
by other evidence, because he found them to be unreli-
able. On appeal, Chief Justice Lamer criticized him for 
this: 
Although he [McEachern] had earlier recog-
nized, when making his ruling on admissibility, 
that it was impossible to make an easy distinction 
between the· mytho1ogica) and "real" aspects of 
these oral histories, he discounted the adaawk and 
kungax [special forms of Giqsan and Wetsu-
wet' en oral history] because they were not "liter-
ally true," confounded "what is fact and what is 
belief," "included some material which might be 
classified as mythology," and projected a "roman-
tic view" of the history of the appellants.30 
Lamer also noted that McEachern bad questioned the 
validity and utility of those oral histories because they 
were "confined to the communities whose histories they 
were and because those oral histories were insuffici-
ently detailed."31 Instead of discounting them for these 
reasons, Lamer instructed that the oral histories should 
have been placed on an "equal footing" with other kinds 
of historical evidence.32. But how exactly are trial judges 
to do this if they cannot distinguish between historical 
fact on the one hand, and legend, myth, and cultural 
values on the other? Or was Chief Justice Lamer sug-
gesting that oral histories could be placed on an equal 
footing without distinguishing these various elements? 
Unfortunately, Lamer did not answer these questions. 
Summarizing his views on this matter, he simply said 
this: 
The implication of the trial judge's reasoning is 
that oral histories should never be given any inde-
pendent weight and are only useful as confirma-
tory evidence in aboriginal rights litigation. I fear 
that if this reasoning were followed, the oral his-
tories of aboriginal peoples would be consistently 
and systematically undervalued by the Canadian 
legal system, in contradiction of the express 
instruction to the contrary in Van der Peet that trial 
courts interpret the evidence of aboriginal peoples 
in light of the difficulties inherent in adjudicating 
aboriginal claims.33 
With respect, these general directions are unlikely to be 
of much assistance to trial judges who want to give 
equal weight to oral histories but are unsure how to do 
so.34 
At the root of the problem are fundamental differ-
ences between the world views of Aboriginal societies 
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and of Anglo-Canadian society, both generally and in 
the legal context. At the outset of the Delgamuukw case, 
the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en recognized this, and 
attempted to explain it to Chief Justice McEachem in 
the opening address of their lawyers to the court. One of 
the challenges facing the court, the lawyers said, was to 
avoid the "natural tendency .. . to look at Indian soci-
eties using a model of the world that derives from 
Western concepts of the nature of the world and soci-
ety. ·•3s In a passage that deserves to be quoted at length, 
they described some of the fundamental differences: 
The Western world view sees the essential and 
primary interactions as being those between 
human beings. To the Gitksan and Wet'suwet' en, 
human beings are part of an interacting continuum 
which includes animals and spirits. Animals and 
fish are viewed as members of societies who have 
intelligence and power, and can influence the 
course of events in terms of their interrelationship 
with human beings. In Western society causality is 
viewed as direct and Hnear. That is to say. that an 
event has the ability to cause or produce another 
event as time moves forward. To the Gitksan and 
Wet'suwet' en, time is not linear but cyclical. The 
events of the "past" are not simply history but are 
something that directly effects [sic] the present and 
the future.36 
They went on to explain how, in the Gitxsan and 
Wet'suwet'en cosmologies, failure by humans to show 
due respect for the bones of animals can prevent those 
animals from being reincarnated and returning to offer 
themselves to humans, causing a loss of vital sources of 
food. They continued: 
It is important to reflect on how such a view of 
causality would be rendered conceptually from 
within a Western framework. Such a view would 
not be regarded as "scientific" and such attribution 
of events to the powers of animals or spirits would 
be characterized as mythical. Both of these adjec-
tives imply that what Indian people believe is not 
real or, at least, if it is real for them, it represents 
primitive mentality, pre-scientific thinking, which 
is to say, magic. On either basis, Indian reality is 
denied or devalued. Their history is not real his-
tory but mythology.31 [emphasis addedJ 
This takes us to the crux of the problem. From some 
of the passages in McEachern's judgment quoted above, 
it is apparent that he did regard most of the oral histories 
of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en as mythology. In spite 
of the lawyers' warnings, he does not seem to have been 
able to escape what they called the "natural tendency" to 
view the evidence of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en 
lhrough the lens of his own culture. But is it ever possi-
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ble to escape the confines of one's culture entirely, when 
such fundamental concepts as time, causality, history, 
and even the content of reality itself, are involved? After 
years of training, anthropologists may come closer to 
accomplishing this than most of us, but should we real-
ly be expecting judges to do so? And even if they could 
accomplish it, how would they then come to a decision? 
ls there really some way of balancing Aboriginal and 
Euro-Canadian perspectives, as Chief Justice Lamer 
suggested, when those perspectives reflect radically dif-
ferent world views? 
These are complex and difficult questions, which we 
do not purport to be able to answer here. Part of the 
problem stems from the fact that Aboriginal peoples 
who seek adjudicated solutions to their Aboriginal 
claims are obliged to go to Canadian courts, which have 
to apply Canadian law. That law reflects the world views 
of Euro-Canadians, not of Aboriginal peoples. So no 
matter how sympathetic the judges may be and how 
willing they are to take account of Aboriginal perspec-
ti ves, at the end of the day their decisions must be made 
in a manner that, in Chief Justice Lamer 's words, "does 
not strain ' the Canadian legal and constitutional struc-
ture. "'38 To a large extent, their hands are tied by the role 
they are obliged to play. 
At the beginning of this article, we observed that 
most Aboriginal land claims are in fact resolved by 
negotiation and agreement, rather than by the courts. In 
negotiations, the parties are not limited by the confines 
of Canadian law and can thus take account of divergent 
realities and perspectives in reaching mutually agreeable 
compromises. So in the context of negotiations, oral his-
tories can be used without having to distinguish between 
their historical and cultural elements. However, negotia-
tions depend on willing participants. Jn British 
Columbia, until 1990, the provincial government stead-
fastly refused to negotiate Aboriginal land claims 
because it did not acknowledge the existence of 
Aboriginal title. So prior to that time, the Gitxsan and 
Wet'suwet'en had little choice but to go to court. Also, 
even where non-Aboriginal governments do participate 
in negotiations, they clearly have the advantage of supe-
rior resources and bargaining power. This is one reason 
the courts, while not the best forum for resolving 
Aboriginal claims, still have an important role to play. 
By affirming the existence of Aboriginal rights and 
drawing some parameters within which negotiations can 
take place, the courts have pushed non-Aboriginal gov-
ernments toward negotiations and have helped to level 
the playing field. 
So the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en are now presented 
with the difficult choice of either re-litigating their 
claims or entering into negotiations. Should they go 
back to court, they will face the costs of another lengthy 
trial, where they will again have to rely on their oral his-
tories to prove their Aboriginal title. While Chief Justice 
Lamer bas indicated that trial judges have " to come to 
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terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies" and 
accord "due weight to the perspective of aboriginal 
peoples,"39 it remains to be seen how this wiJI be done in 
the context of a Canadian courtroom. 
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